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    Abstract 
The Dutch disease phenomenon is front and centre in explaining the poor economic 
performance of resource-rich economies. While it is well documented in the literature that 
resource discoveries or booms have adverse effects on manufacturing, little is known about 
the role of sectoral credit allocation in accentuating or mitigating this phenomenon. Using 
monthly sectoral loan data across 13 oil-rich countries over the period 1994-2017, we find the 
pattern of credit allocation to be consistent with the Dutch disease: oil price booms are 
associated with contraction (expansion) in manufacturing (services) sector share of credit. 
These findings are robust to a battery of robustness tests. Consequently, we argue that 
sectoral credit allocation is a channel through which productive resources are shifted toward 
the non-tradable sector at the expenses of the tradable sector. To the extent that financial 
systems in oil-rich economies efficiently intermediate resource windfalls, it could potentially 
countervail the Dutch disease syndrome.  
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1. Introduction 
 
One common explanation for the poor economic performance of resource-rich economies is 
the so-called Dutch disease. It refers to the adverse effects of a resource boom or discovery 
on the manufacturing sector. The underlying proposition follows from the seminal idea of 
Corden and Neary (1982), that the sharp inflow of foreign currency from the resource boom 
leads to currency appreciation and wealth effects, which in turn make the domestic 
production and export of manufacturing sector less competitive1. Essentially, manufacturing 
is ‘‘crowded out’’ by the booming commodity sector, as often demonstrated by reduced 
investments in manufacturing sectors (Gylfason and Zoega, 2006).  
While a sparse strand2 of the literature explores the linkages between commodity 
markets and financial systems; so far, we know little about the extent to which bank credit 
policies or lending patterns accentuate or mitigate the cyclical effects of commodity prices on 
macroeconomic performance3. To what extent do banks countervail the Dutch disease 
through their credit screening and efficient intermediation function? How effective are the 
financial systems of resource-rich economies in serving as buffers towards smoothening 
economic performance over commodity cycles? Do sectoral lending patterns accentuate or 
mitigate the crowding-out of tradeable sectors? Do banks see beyond commodity price 
booms? 
To our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence on bank lending behaviour or credit 
policy during commodity price booms; hence, the importance of our analysis is threefold. 
First, analysing sectoral credit flows during commodity booms could offer crucial insight into 
the potential role of credit markets in mitigating the Dutch disease. Specifically, we explore 
                                                          
1 For instance, Ismail (2010) demonstrates that a 10% increase in the size of a commodity boom is associated with a 3.4% 
fall in manufacturing value added. 
2 For instance, a theme in this strand (e.g. Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009; Beck, 2011; Beck and Poelhekke, 2017) suggests the 
existence of a natural resource curse in the financial sectors of resource-rich countries. A second theme (e.g. Kinda et al., 
2016; Agarwal et al., 2017) attempts to link financial sector stability to negative commodity price shocks. 
3 See Beck (2016) for some discussions on the gaps in literature pertaining to financial markets and the resource curse. 
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the idea that banks’ efficient intermediation business or capital allocation can potentially 
countervail the Dutch disease syndrome. Our underlying intuition is that banks’ can see 
beyond the boom4, hence behaving as if they were conducting countervailing monetary policy 
that smoothens economic performance over commodity cycles. 
Secondly, credit allocation patterns across banking sectors in resource-rich countries 
could provide useful information on the strategic response of banks to commodity price 
movements. We argue that the strategic behaviour of lenders during commodity booms is an 
implicit indicator of financial sector development across resource-rich economies. Therefore, 
to the extent that bank lending behaviour is decoupled from commodity cycles, it represents 
an implicit indicator of financial system development and its potential resilience to adverse 
commodity shocks. 
Thirdly, because this study employs decomposed sectoral bank credit data, it allows 
us to contribute to the literature on the sectoral concentration of bank assets, which is a major 
historical contributor to banking sector health (see Westernhagen et al., 2004). For instance, 
concentrated credit to booming sectors might potentially impose huge social costs and 
undesirable outcomes during negative price shocks. This speaks to the “flight to quality” 
arguments by Bernanke, et al. (1996) that borrowers who are likely to bear the adverse 
effects of exogenous shocks should, in principle, experience reduced credit access, relative to 
other firms/sectors.  
In this paper, we attempt to answer the above questions using monthly sectoral loan 
data for a sample of 13 oil producing countries over the period 1994-2017. We apply a credit 
rationing model in which banks are faced with a range of projects across different sectors of 
the economy. To accomplish our empirical objective, we test the hypothesis that banks 
intermediate oil windfalls by allocating credit as if they were conducting countervailing 
                                                          
4 This idea is based on the screening and credit rationing functions of banks. We discuss this idea in greater detail in our 
theoretical framework.  
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monetary policy to mitigate the Dutch disease. Specifically, we investigate the relationship 
between sectoral credit shares and oil price booms using an instrumental variables (IV) 
approach that addresses the potential endogeneity of oil price booms arising from positive oil 
price shocks due to events in sampled oil producing countries.  
Exploiting exogenous variation in the magnitude and effects of oil price booms across 
sampled countries, we find that oil booms are associated with contraction (expansion) in 
manufacturing (services) sector share of banking sector credit. These findings are robust to a 
battery of robustness tests such as accounting for country-specific effects, addressing 
heterogeneity and endogeneity concerns, employing alternative measures of oil booms, 
amongst a range of other sensitivity tests. Given these findings, we reject the hypotheses that 
banks see beyond the commodity boom by allocating credit as if they were conducting 
countervailing monetary policy to countervail the Dutch disease through their credit 
screening and efficient intermediation function. The implications of our results are (i) sectoral 
credit allocation pattern across sampled economies represents a channel through which 
productive resources are shifted toward the non-tradable sector at the expenses of the tradable 
sector. (ii) monetary authorities across sampled countries have to take on the role of seeing 
beyond the boom as they cannot rely on the banks’ efficient capital allocation business to 
carry out countervailing policies and (iii) sectoral credit flows provide useful insight on the 
sectoral productivity performance and wider macroeconomic performance of sampled oil-rich 
countries.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a theoretical 
framework to underpin our empirical model. In section 3, we discuss the empirical strategy 
and present our econometric model. Section 4 describes the data and descriptive statistics. In 
particular, we provide a detailed discussion on the potential measurement issues implicit in 
deriving a measure of oil price boom. Section 5 discusses the empirical results, along with 
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robustness and sensitivity tests on the impact of oil booms on bank credit patterns. Section 6 
concludes with some key policy implications and findings. 
2. Analytical framework 
 
2.1. Theoretical considerations 
We seek to analyze the role of booming oil prices on bank credit allocation to key sectors of 
the economy. To the extent that booming oil prices are associated with relative contraction of 
credit to the tradeable sectors5 of the economy, it suggests the presence of the Dutch disease 
syndrome. We follow the classic framework of Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden (1984) 
by assuming that each country in our sample has an economy that is characterized by a non-
tradable sector N (e.g. services) and two other sectors including (i) the booming sector B (i.e. 
oil sector) and (ii) the lagging sector L (e.g. manufacturing sector). In this core model, we 
assume that output in each sector requires sector-specific capital and labour6.  
As shown by previous studies (e.g. Beck, 2011), a range of macroeconomic effects 
can arise because of the boom, but we focus on the most common spending effect whereby 
the oil windfall is spent into the economy (e.g. by the government or factor owners), raising 
the price of N relative to L since N is a normal good with a positive income elasticity. In 
short, L is weakened by the real appreciation in the relative prices in terms of N, drawing 
factor inputs out of L into N while also strongly stimulating demand for N relative to L. In the 
following sub-sections, we attempt to set out a theoretical model of banks’ sectoral credit 
allocation, emphasizing the potential impact of uncertainty arising from exogenous sectoral 
shocks such as oil market shocks. 
2.2.Bank credit policy and credit allocation 
                                                          
5 We largely refer to manufacturing as the main tradeable sector.  
6 Labour is assumed to be mobile across the three sectors towards equalizing wages 
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We utilize a theoretical framework of bank credit allocation to motivate our empirical 
analysis. Our main task is to demonstrate how (and to what extent) credit policies are shaped 
or correlated with oil price booms across sampled countries. Following Rajan (1994), we set 
out by assuming that bank managers are rational but have concerns about short-run 
disruptions. Consider an economy with banks that have many potential borrowers across 
several sectors of the economy. Using a classic one-period model of bank credit allocation 
decision, we assume that each of the banks have only one type of asset: credit or loans (C) 
and two types of liabilities: capital (K) and deposits (D)7, so we write the linear balance sheet 
constraint (ignoring other arguments such as required capital or asset ratio requirements, etc) 
as: 
          𝐴𝐴 = 𝐶𝐶 = 𝐾𝐾 + 𝐷𝐷      [1] 
The market for C and D are imperfectly competitive and are influenced by the market interest 
rate. Ignoring other model arguments for simplicity, we assume that banks maximize profits 
𝜋𝜋 as the margin between interest income on loans 𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 and interest expense on deposits 𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 
less loan losses (𝛿𝛿𝐿𝐿): 
            𝜋𝜋 = (𝑟𝑟𝐿𝐿 − 𝛿𝛿)𝐿𝐿 − 𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷      [2] 
 
One critical attribute of the analysis above is that the size of 𝜋𝜋 is a critical function of the 
efficiency or quality of the bank’s credit allocation. We therefore posit that credit markets are 
different from standard markets, in that excess demand for credit is an ongoing phenomenon 
in the market such that many credit applications are not met. Hence, credit allocation is based 
on a rationing system8. Critically, this credit rationing assumption allows us to motivate our 
empirical credit allocation model as more of a supply schedule than a demand model. 
2.2.1. Credit rationing and bank screening function 
                                                          
7 Peek and Rosengren (1995). 
8 See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for a classic treatment of credit rationing by banks 
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To ration credit, banks must perform a screening function to distinguish between good and 
bad risks. Assuming that banks are faced with a range of projects across different sectors of 
the economy where for each project p in sector s there is a probability of returns R with 
different probability distribution across firm-sectors. However, banks cannot absolutely 
determine the riskiness of a project, so we can write the density function of the loan returns as  
                 𝐹𝐹 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑅𝑅,𝜃𝜃)       [3] 
where 𝜃𝜃 is a measure that is increasing in risk. Because the bank and borrowers across 
different sectors have differential information about project risks, there is scope for imperfect 
or asymmetrical information9. This creates uncertainty, the impact of which can be illustrated 
by considering a sectoral project with precisely two possible outcomes: a “good” outcome (𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺) and an inferior “bad” outcome (𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵) i.e. (𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺 > 𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵). The likelihood of each outcome is 
𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺  and 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 where 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 = 1 so that the expected value 𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸  
        𝑂𝑂𝐸𝐸 = 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵     [4] 
2.2.2. Classification of borrowers as a public good 
Consider a one-period loan where the amount borrowed is B at an interest rate of r so that the 
expected repayment is (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐵𝐵 with default occurring when 𝑂𝑂 < (1 + 𝑟𝑟)𝐵𝐵. It should be 
clear now that (i) expected repayment rises as the interest rate rises and (ii) falls as 
uncertainty 𝛿𝛿 rises. We therefore assume that banks prefer safer projects and higher loan rates 
while borrowers across different sectors prefer the opposite. This implies that expected 
repayment is a function of project riskiness so that banks classify borrowers/sectors based on 
their risk; hence it should be clear that 𝜃𝜃′(𝛿𝛿) > 0 i.e. risk of default is an increasing function 
of uncertainty. Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) suggest that this classification and screening 
function are front and center in the banking system allocation function in an economy. They 
                                                          
9 Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) assume that borrowers know the expected return and risks of their projects while banks only 
know the expected risk and return of the average project in the sector or economy 
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argue that the efficiency of credit allocation in the economy depends on the reliability of the 
borrower screening and classification function. The “public good” element of this function 
ensures that adverse market/sectoral conditions may be managed and mitigated in ways that 
the overall return to the society/economy is net positive. This is especially true in cases when 
an entire borrowing sector is hit by an (unpredictable) systematic adverse shock such as an oil 
price shock. In other words, there is a systematic sectoral component of uncertainty (Rajan, 
1994), which explains Stiglitz’s (1993; pp.23) views on the resource allocation role that 
banks play in an economy, arguing that “if they fail, not only will the sector's profits be lower than 
they would otherwise have been, but the performance of the entire economic system may be 
impaired”10.  
3. Identification strategy 
Following from the theoretical idea on bank screening and allocation functions, we 
hypothesize as follows: 
• H0. Banks see beyond the commodity boom by allocating credit as if they were 
conducting countervailing monetary policy to intermediate oil windfalls and 
mitigate the Dutch disease; 
• HA. Banks credit allocation mirrors commodity cycles and accentuates the Dutch 
disease by crowding out tradable sectors. 
The above hypotheses are ensued in the Dutch disease phenomenon and we assume that they 
could help deepen our understanding of how banks’ lending behavior in resource rich 
economies contribute to mitigating the Dutch disease. In order to examine the relationship 
between oil price booms and sectoral credit allocation, we specify and estimate the baseline 
panel data regression as follows, 
                                                          
10 See Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Galindo and Micco (2004) for some empirical evidence suggesting that the banking 
system’s capital allocation towards sectors with the best economic viability can stimulate economic growth. 
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                  𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝜸𝜸𝜸𝜸𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘′ + 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘 + ε𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘                       [5] 
 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is the credit share of sector k in country i in period t, 𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is the boom variable for 
country i in time t, 𝜸𝜸𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘′  is a vector of banking sector and macroeconomic characteristics, 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘 
represents country specific effects, and ε𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is the random error term. 𝛼𝛼1 is our parameter of 
interest which measures the extent to which oil booms influence sectoral credit shares.  
 
3.1.Instrumental Variables (IV) approach 
The classic problem with the estimation of [5] is the potential endogeneity of the oil boom 
variable. Therefore, the identification of the parameters in [5] is a problem. Additionally, an 
underlying simultaneity problem arises from the fact that international oil prices are 
endogenously determined in a global supply-and-demand system. Although, we can observe 
market oil prices as equilibrium points of a reduced form relationship from transactions 
embedded within oil supply and demand functions, not all market covariates are observed. 
Moreover, other country-specific developments such as geopolitical events and market power 
in the global market power11 could also influence world oil price movements (See Kilian, 
2009).12 While we can control for the fixed unobserved heterogeneity across sampled 
countries by purging these effects using a fixed effects model, other time-varying effects that 
may explain the variations in the impact of oil price booms across sampled countries might 
be embedded or conflated with random shocks in ε𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘.  
Given the discussions above on the oil demand and supply covariates; along with the 
other fixed and time-varying country specific factors implicit in 𝜇𝜇𝑘𝑘 and ε𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘, respectively will 
                                                          
11 For instance, consider the market power possessed by Saudi Arabia as a swing oil producer that could influence global oil 
prices by manipulating its supply levels.  
12 Additionally, each country in our data sample has its own economic, political, and institutional characteristics which 
might be correlated with other regressors. With panel data fixed-effects models, we can control for some of the country-
specific effects, but other omitted variable and time varying influences are likely to be embedded in the random shock within 
the model which might bias parameter estimates. 
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be correlated with the boom variable 𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 in the model [5]. Hence, the underlying 
identification problem implies that ordinary least squares (OLS) methods will not yield 
efficient or consistent estimates of the effects of the boom variables on bank lending 
behavior. Given the foregoing, we resort to an instrumental variables (IV) approach. Ideally, 
we need “good instruments” that possess the three key attributes of relevance, validity and 
orthogonality for the IV estimation to be efficient and consistent. To address this challenge, 
we can derive IV candidates for the oil price boom variable using exclusion restrictions on 
the demand and supply side of the oil market system. Specifically, we consider exogenous 
demand shifters that do not shift market supply and vice versa, or even exogenous factors that 
might influence both the demand and supply sides of the market13.  
3.1.1. Instrumental Variables (IV) candidates 
Guided by theory and empirical evidence, we instrument for the oil boom variable using data 
from (i) total world oil rig count (ii) variable cost of oil production in the US (iii) average 
world temperature.14 We take the world oil rig count data from Baker Hughes, Inc. database. 
We derive the variable cost of oil production using information on oil and gas employees, 
man-hours, wages and oil output from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA). We take the average global temperature from the 
U.K. Met Office Hadley Centre observations datasets (Morice, et al., 2012). Notice that these 
instruments are either global or fall under regions outside sampled oil countries. This ensures 
exogeneity of the instruments. We then derive country-specific versions of the instruments by 
normalizing these global instruments with country-specific shares of total world oil reserves. 
This weight is appealing since it preserves the exogeneity of the resulting instruments given 
that oil endowment is naturally occurring phenomenon.   
                                                          
13 See Manski (2003). 
14 See Lin (2008) for some discussions 
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4. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
4.1.Data sample 
To investigate the relationship between sectoral allocation of credit and commodity booms, 
we draw on a number of data sources: (i) several issues of central banks’ statistical bulletins; 
(ii) the US Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) database; (iii) BP Annual Statistical 
Bulletin; (iv) IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS); (v) the instruments for IV 
regressions are taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Oil and Gas Journal, 
Baker Hughes Inc. database, the U.K. Met Office, the World Bank Climate Change 
Knowledge Portal, and (vi) firm-level data on manufacturing enterprises are taken from the 
World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) to check firm-level dependence on external finance.  
Our dataset comprises of monthly information on bank credit to manufacturing and 
services sectors across 13 oil producing countries over the period 1994-2017. Table 1 
presents a background on our sampled countries using the latest available information (for 
2016) on key economic indicators on income, oil contribution and financial development. 
Qatar, UAE and Bahrain have the highest per capita incomes, which are well in excess of the 
average income of $31,715 across the whole sample; whereas Indonesia, Nigeria and Côte 
d'Ivoire have the lowest income levels. The global oil production share indicates that our 
sampled countries account for around half of world oil production with Saudi Arabia 
(13.4%), Russia (12.2%) and UAE (4.4%) ranking as the top-three producers.  
The average degree of resource dependence across our sample can be inferred from 
oil share of total goods export, which stood at 47% in 2016. Nigeria (91%), Kuwait (89%) 
and Azerbaijan (87%) appear to be the most reliant on oil, with the Latin American countries 
in our sample namely Mexico and Brazil being the least-dependent. Finally, we measure 
financial development using credit to the private sector as ratio of GDP. The average ratio for 
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our sample is 55% with Nigeria (16%) being the least developed, in contrast to Malaysia 
(124%) and Kuwait (99%) at the top. 
Table 1: Income, oil contribution and financial development across countries, 2016. 
Source: BP annual statistical bulletin, World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) 
 
4.2. Key variables and data sources 
Our final dataset contains information on oil producing countries for which we could find 
data15, yielding a data sample of 2206 observations.  We deflate all monetary values to 2012 
(2012 = 100) prices using monthly CPI data obtained from IMF IFS database. The deflated 
series are then converted to common international unit prices using the purchasing power 
parity (PPP) conversion factors. A brief description of the key variables are given in the 
following section. 
4.2.1. Sectoral credit 
                                                          
15 We try to include all oil producing countries, but in the end some countries have no monthly data on sectoral credit 
allocation. In some cases, some statistical bulletins do not offer the granular sectoral classifications that we employ in this 
study. For instance, these statistical bulletins only offer domestic credit allocation based on total “private” and “public” 
sector credit distribution. It is for these reasons that our dataset covers the 13 countries for which we could gather reliable 
data. 
Country 
 
Per capita income 
(PPP, 2011=100) 
Share of world oil 
production (%) 
Oil share of total 
export (%) 
Credit to private 
sector (% of GDP) 
Azerbaijan 15994.00 0.90 87.10 25.40 
Bahrain 50719.12 0.02 50.35 73.72 
Brazil 14023.69 2.80 6.34 62.18 
Indonesia 10764.55 1.10 23.21 33.11 
Kazakhstan 23419.91 1.80 60.74 30.77 
Kuwait 35490.21 3.40 89.11 98.97 
Malaysia 25660.46 0.80 16.09 123.97 
Mexico 16831.12 2.70 6.07 26.80 
Nigeria 5438.92 2.20 90.85 15.64 
Qatar 118215.30 2.10 82.80 79.40 
Russia 24026.00 12.20 63.00 54.72 
Saudi Arabia 50458.17 13.40 78.40 57.98 
UAE 67133.07 4.40 42.50 85.89 
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In order to analyze bank sectoral credit allocation during commodity booms, our dependent 
variable ought to reflect the changes in a sector’s share of the banking systems total credit. 
Hence, we define and compute our dependent variable as: 
         𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘∑ 𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗≠𝑘𝑘         [6] 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is the credit share of sector16 k in country i in period t, 𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is the total banking 
system17 loans and advances to sector k across sampled countries and time periods, while 
∑ 𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗≠𝑘𝑘  is the total loans and advances across all k sectors across country i during period t. 
The use of sectoral loan shares, as opposed to total loans across sectors ensures that we can 
capture or isolate the evolution of the relative importance of different sectors in the credit 
policy or allocation across sampled banking sectors. This approach is necessary, given that 
credit to the economy will likely move in certain directions during extreme economy events 
or shocks. For instance, credit is likely to expand across all sectors of the economy during 
economic booms and vice versa, albeit the rate of expansion or contraction may differ across 
sectors.  
The compilation of a dataset suitable for our analysis required a major effort in terms 
of data collection as we rely on hand-collected sectoral breakdown of lending exposures. 
Specifically, we use sectoral credit composition data, which we collected from several 
hundreds of central bank monthly statistical bulletins across 13 oil-producers.  
4.2.2. Defining and verifying the strength of oil price booms 
                                                          
16 The sectors covered in our analysis are tradeable sector (i.e. manufacturing) and non-tradeable sector (i.e. services). 
17 Although we use banking sector-level flow of credit to industries, we considered bank level allocation. However, we note 
that due to the challenge that data on bank sectoral exposures are not directly available from commercial databases. Further, 
even when we considered a hand-collection based approach to deriving sectoral lending exposures at the bank level using 
publicly available financial statements, we observed that that the resulting database will be too limited in terms of the time 
series dimension (e.g. for many banks across sampled countries, we could only get data for around 5 years) due largely to 
missing observations attributable to high frequency of entry and exit in the banking sector, or mergers and acquisition. This 
limited timeframe is inadequate to study the evolution of commodity price booms. In addition, our detailed checks also 
demonstrate that the available sectoral loans data is limited to very large banks, which might not be representative of the 
overall banking system’s business loan portfolio. Hence, we stick to the sectoral loan data obtained from statutory central 
bank credit registers. 
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Our main independent variable is oil price boom. While the definition of an economic boom 
is a straightforward matter, constructing its quantitative measure is a complicated matter. The 
complication arises from many considerations including (but not limited to) the potential 
endogeneity issues18, as well as the quantitative precision of such boom measure (see Wu and 
Cavallo, 2012). Given these considerations, we set out to construct commodity boom 
measures as follows. Our starting point is that we conceptually define a boom as a period or 
episode of major and persistent deviations from an observed trend towards high states 
(Hamilton, 1989; Agnello and Schuknecht, 2011). To this end, we define an oil price boom 
using the conceptual idea that it refers to situations where actual market prices substantially 
exceed expected prices19. Consequently, we derive our oil boom measure as the percent 
deviations between actual and forecast oil price data in period t,  
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘 = �100 ∗ (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘 − 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘)𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘 , during time 𝐴𝐴0,            otherwise                                                
                 [7] 
We use real oil spot prices as a proxy for actual prices, while the forecast prices are 
represented by real crude oil future contract data. Both price series are obtained from the EIA 
database20. The rationale for using futures prices (as a measure of commodity price forecasts) 
is that they embody market operators’ best views and expectations about prices21. An added 
advantage of this approach is that these market expectations are accessible or observable by 
                                                          
18 For instance, some oil price shocks are not entirely exogenous or unanticipated, such as in cases where swings in 
commodity prices embody endogenous changes such as shocks in major oil producing countries or slumps in the global 
macroeconomy. See appendix D for a graphical illustration of some of these events during our sample period. 
19 See Plante and Dhaliwal (2017) 
20 These oil price series are deflated using CPI data normalised to (2012=100). 
21 For instance, in a survey by Hamilton (2009) it is shown that, at the minimum, future oil prices embody rational 
expectations about future spot prices. Similarly, Wu and McCallum (2005) compare the forecasting performance of “futures-
spot spread” with those of other forecasting models and they find that the futures-spot spread approach outperformed the 
other models, especially when the forecasting horizons are within few months, as is the case that we use monthly data in this 
study.  
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all oil producing countries. A second issue which we address is the size and relevance of the 
boom variable. It is plausible to imagine that an oil boom is likely to take heterogenous 
relevance or have varying levels of impact across oil-rich countries, depending on the degree 
of oil dependence across sampled countries. For this reason, following Deaton and Miller 
(1995) and Combes, et al. (2014), we normalize the boom measure in eqn. [7] using country-
specific weights, 
         𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘             [8] 
where 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘 is a measure of oil dependence derived as the ratio of the value of oil exports 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜 
to total exports 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘 in base year b22. These country weights are sensible since the 
implication/size/relevance of an oil price boom for a country will depend on the degree of its 
economic dependence on oil. Furthermore, given that the resulting (fixed) weights are applied 
to the time-varying commodity boom variable for the different time periods, the resulting 
boom variable (i) retains the movements in global oil prices in eqn. [7] (ii) it embodies 
country-specific conditions via eqn. [8] and finally (iii) it mitigates the endogeneity concerns 
arising from unpredictability and country-induced supply side shocks.23 Although, as noted 
by Musayev (2014), one limitation of this weighting scheme is that it might omit changes in 
the term of trade structure of sampled countries or even short-term dynamics arising from 
production shocks. For this reason, we explore alternative boom measures. See empirical 
results section.24 
4.2.3. Strength of commodity price boom 
We verify the robustness and reliability of our boom measure by verifying its strengths or 
correlation with conventional measures of commodity shocks from the literature. We 
                                                          
22 Following the common practice in the literature, we take the sample mid-point as our base year: 2012.  
23 For instance, new oil discoveries or geopolitical events.  
24 See empirical results section. 
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hypothesize that our oil boom measure ought to embody positive oil price shocks. Following 
Kinda et al. (2016), we retrieve positive oil price shocks as follows. First, we regress real oil 
prices on their lags (up to three lags) and a quadratic time trend, 
ln𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐,0 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐,1𝐴𝐴 + 𝛼𝛼𝑐𝑐,2𝐴𝐴2 + �𝜃𝜃𝑐𝑐,𝑝𝑝3
𝑝𝑝
ln𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑘𝑘−𝑝𝑝 + 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐,𝑘𝑘 
                 [9] 
The oil price shocks are then measured as the residuals of the regression above. The shock 
measure above also has an added advantage that, given that commodity prices can be I(1) or 
I(2),  it makes the shock measure stationary and removes the predictable element from the 
stationary process (Kinda et al., 2016). Secondly, since this study relates to price booms, we 
are only interested in the positive shocks, so we normalize the residuals by rescaling them 
between 0 and 1. Finally, in order to test the robustness of the boom measure, we regress the 
boom variable (from eqns. 7 and 8) on the positive oil shock variable (from eqn. 9) using 
robust standard errors. As shown in eqn. [10] below, the shock variable enters significantly at 
the 1% level of significance (t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis), indicating that the 
boom variable is positively associated with (or embodies/captures) positive oil price shocks. 
It is therefore powerful enough in capturing consistent upswings in oil prices 
                    𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 0.78 (5.68) + 3.17 (4.96) ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹_𝐹𝐹ℎ𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘   [10] 
            𝑅𝑅2= 0.46  
4.3.Banking sector and other country-specific control variables 
In addition to our main independent variable: commodity price booms, we control for an 
array of banking sector and macroeconomic characteristics such as total deposits, equity 
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capital, interest rate, exchange rate, liquidity, size of the banking sector, institutional quality25 
and an OPEC dummy26.  
4.4.Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. The mean value 
of manufacturing share of loans is 12.5% with a standard deviation of 6.92%, compared to 
41.7% and 4.7%, respectively for the services sector. Although left-skewed, the standard 
deviations for both variables suggest considerable cross-country variation in the level of 
sectoral bank credits. In particular, it is noteworthy to highlight that, on average, services 
sector share of credit is three times larger than manufacturing share of credit; bearing the 
hallmarks of the Dutch disease phenomenon. Unsurprisingly, agricultural share of bank credit 
is even much lower at 1.9% share of total credit during the period under review.  
 
                                                          
25 See Appendix C for details on the construction of our institutional quality measure using principal component analysis 
(PCA). 
26 See Appendix A for detailed definitions and sources of the variables used in this study. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max # of countries # of obs. 
Banking sector-level data 
    
  
Agriculture share of credit (%) 1.91 1.84 0.001 8.73 13 2206 
Manufacturing sector share of credit (%) 12.47 6.92 1.41 37.58 13 2206 
Service sector share of credit (%) 41.68 4.74 26.35 49.30 13 2206 
Oil price boom (%) 0.49 1.19 0.001 14.39 13 2206 
Real interest rate (%) 10.26 7.01 3.30 73.78 13 2206 
Total deposits (billion, ppp $) 18.80 66.20 0.03 548 13 2206 
Total capital (billion, ppp $) 0.91 2.62 -0.02 20.40 13 2206 
Real exchange rate (index, 2012=100) 111.31 39.36 62.52 395.12 13 2206 
M2/Reserve  3.43 1.90 0.44 22.53 13 2206 
Total assets (billion, ppp $) 6.49 13.10 0.04 83.70 13 2206 
OPEC (Dummy=1, 0 otherwise) 0.44 0.50 0 1 13 2206 
Institutional quality index 0.25 0.90 -1.68 2.01 13 2206 
 
    
  Instrumental variables     
  Real unit labour cost of per barrel of oil in the US ($, 2012=100) 42.42 13.86 25.15 83.63 
 
272 
Average global temperature (degree Celsius)  0.52 0.17 0.10 1.11 
 
272 
OECD industrial index (2012=100) 97.47 8.83 78.28 110.00 
 
272 
Total world oil rigs 2315.34 1106.27 88.24 3900   272 
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5. Empirical results 
5.1.Stationarity 
We begin our econometric analysis with formal tests to examine stationarity (unit roots) for 
our panel data set. We conduct the first-generation Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) test 
(hereafter referred to as the IPS test), as well as the second-generation test of Pesaran (2007) 
which augments the IPS test by accounting for cross-sectional dependence across sampled 
countries (hereafter referred to as the CIPS test). Table B1 in the appendix presents results on  
 these unit root tests. They indicate that the variables employed in this study are in general 
I(1) except exchange rate which is I(0). In particular, the results on both tests clearly indicate 
that the sectoral credit shares and the oil boom series are stationary variables.   
5.2.Baseline results: oil price boom and sectoral credit flows 
Next, we focus on the endogeneity of the boom measure using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
procedure where we test the corresponding orthogonality condition under the null hypothesis 
that it can be treated as exogenous. The test statistic, which is robust to heteroscedaticity or 
other violations of conditional homoscedasticity, is distributed as 𝜒𝜒2. This endogeneity test 
yields a test statistic of 11.96 with chi p-value = 0.000; rejecting the null that the boom 
variable is exogenous at conventional levels. This suggests that our specified model cannot be 
consistently estimated with OLS estimators under the assumption of orthogonality of the 
regressors.  
Hence in our baseline results given in Table 3, we present both OLS and IV 
estimations for bank credit allocation to our sectors of interest. The first two columns pertain 
to the manufacturing sector, while the third and fourth columns are for service sector credit 
regressions.  Our main analyses are based on the IV estimations, for which we instrument for 
the boom variable using global average monthly temperature, scaled by sampled countries’ 
share of world oil reserves. We note that the appropriateness of the IV estimation depends on 
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the use of “good instruments” that possess the key attributes of relevance, validity and 
orthogonality. Confirming these attributes requires a few considerations. 
Table 3: Oil price boom and credit allocation: Baseline regressions 
The dependent variables are the sector shares of total credit, defined as the ratio of manufacturing or services sector loans to 
total loans. Columns 2 and 4 report the OLS coefficients for both sectors. Columns 3 and 5 report IV estimates. The IV 
specifications use temperature, one and two lags. Kleibergen-Paap weak and underidentification LM and Wald tests are 
conducted under the null hypotheses that model is weakly identified and underidentified. For the weak id test, 10% maximal 
IV critical value in parentheses. For the under-id test, Chi p-values are reported in parentheses. Hansen test statistic of the 
over-identifying restrictions is asymptotically chi-square distributed under the null of instrument validity; p-values are 
reported in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported in parenthesis are clustered for countries. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
First, because we include fixed effects in the model, the instrument ought to have time 
and cross-sectional variations. Second, it must be correlated with ∆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 and thirdly, it 
  Manufacturing loan share   Services loan share 
 Variable FE FE-IV  FE FE-IV 
Boom -0.0012* -0.0107*** 
 
0.0011** 0.0076*** 
 
[0.0007] [0.0031] 
 
[0.0005] [0.0021] 
Deposit 0.0102 0.0100*** 
 
-0.0023 -0.0014 
 
[0.0122] [0.0038] 
 
[0.0141] [0.0033] 
Capital 0.0026*** 0.0031*** 
 
0.0048* 0.0043*** 
 
[0.0029] [0.0009] 
 
[0.0025] [0.0009] 
Interest rate 0.1585*** 0.1290*** 
 
-0.0973** -0.0772*** 
 
[0.039] [0.0168] 
 
[0.0454] [0.0192] 
Exchange rate -0.0066** -0.0095* 
 
-0.0026 -0.0001 
 [0.028] [0.0053] 
 
[0.0204] [0.0044] 
Liquidity -0.0091** -0.0108*** 
 
0.0044 0.0052*** 
 [0.0045] [0.0013] 
 
[0.0035] [0.001] 
Size -0.0103* -0.0100*** 
 
0.0035 0.0031*** 
 [0.0055] [0.0012] 
 
[0.0053] [0.0011] 
OPEC 0.0960*** 0.0932*** 
 
-0.0512*** -0.0492*** 
 [0.0084] [0.0055] 
 
[0.0067] [0.0032] 
Institutions  0.0038 0.0040*** 
 
-0.0065 -0.0066*** 
 [0.0046] [0.0008] 
 
[0.0041] [0.0007] 
   
 
  
R-squared 0.61 0.54 
 
0.49 0.42 
Month dummies Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Under id test: KP LM statistic  35.33 
  
35.33 
  [0.000]   
[0.000] 
Weak id test: KP LM statistic  37.94 
  
37.94 
  [19.93]   
[19.93] 
Over id test: Hansen J statistic  0.04 
  
0.05 
  [0.84]   
[0.82] 
Instrument  
 
Weather 
  
Weather 
N 2206 2180  2206 2180 
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must be orthogonal to the firm-specific time varying elements remaining in the error process 
∆ε𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘. The first consideration is verified, given that all instruments (global temperature, 
variable cost of oil production in the US and worldwide oil rig count) are time-varying 
variables. Additionally, cross-sectional variation in the instruments are ensured by the cross-
country differences in share of world oil reserves (our instrument weights). For the second 
consideration, we resort to the strong statistical significance of the instruments in the first-
stage IV regressions27, while the third orthogonality condition can be tested in the context of 
an overidentified model using a Sargan (1958) or Hansen (1982) test of overidentifying 
restrictions.  
Notice that the p-values of the Hansen J-statistics are 0.84 and 0.82 for the 
manufacturing and services sector regressions respectively, indicating that we fail to reject 
the null hypothesis that all instruments are uncorrelated with ε𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘. Hence, the orthogonality 
conditions are satisfied, and the over-instrumentation problem is minimized in the IV 
regressions28. In particular, the Hansen J test results seem to be supported by a visual 
inspection of the IV estimates versus the OLS estimates in Table 3 which corroborates the 
importance of controlling for the endogeneity of the boom variable. We observe sizable 
differences between the OLS and IV estimates: the IV estimates for both sector regressions 
are numerically larger than the OLS estimates of the boom coefficient. This is expected since 
the OLS estimator does not account for correlation between country-specific events which 
may influence world oil markets and prices.  
Turning now to the coefficient estimates on our main dependent variable, it is clear 
from the results presented in Table 3 that oil booms are associated with contraction 
(expansion) of credit shares to the manufacturing (service) sector. The IV estimates are 
                                                          
27 See Table B2 in appendix 
28 The Kleibergen-Paap (2006) underidentification and weak identification LM test statistics also reject the null hypotheses 
that the IV models are underidentified or weakly identified 
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significant at 1% level, implying that banking sector credit allocation across sampled 
countries are pro-cyclical in a manner that is symptomatic of the Dutch disease: during 
booms, credit allocation is more favorable to the service sector but detrimental to the real 
sector (manufacturing). These findings are economically important as they indicate that 
banking sector credit flows/allocation are likely to amplify the Dutch disease syndrome. This 
is also consistent with the view that financial sectors across commodity rich economies might 
play contributory roles in the resource curse. This credit allocation pattern is potentially a 
channel/contributor to the falling investment in manufacturing during commodity booms.  
We now consider the effects of the control variables in our baseline regressions. 
Controls include interest rate, exchange rate, size of the banking sector, liquidity, equity 
capital, customer deposits. We also control for institutional quality and OPEC membership. 
Their coefficients are largely consistent across estimators, and they appear to underpin the 
variation in results on the credit allocation across both sectors. For instance, notice that, apart 
from the coefficients on capital, the coefficients on the other controls indicate alternating 
signs that underscore the asymmetrical credit conditions across both sectors. Specifically, it 
appears that increased liquidity and larger banking sectors across sampled countries seem to 
favour the services sectors than manufacturing sectors.  
 As might be expected, countries with stronger institutions seem to allocate greater 
credit shares to manufacturing relative to services sector. This confirms the role of strong 
institutions in the allocation of resources within economic systems (Beck et al., 2005; 
Hawkins, 2006). Interestingly, OPEC countries also seem to allocate more credit to 
manufacturing than the service sector. It is not immediately clear why this is the case, but the 
reason for this is outside the scope of this paper.  The coefficient on exchange rate offers 
important insight on the currency appreciation channel of the Dutch disease phenomenon. An 
important element of the Dutch disease hypothesis is that currency appreciation hurts the real 
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sector (manufacturing) since it raises their prices relative to other countries. Our real 
exchange rate data is the IMF’s real effective exchange rate (REER): the real value of a 
currency against a weighted average of several foreign currencies. An increase in the REER 
indicates that exports have become more expensive and while imports become cheaper. The 
exchange rate coefficients for the service sector regressions are negative but not significant 
across the board. However, they are significant (and negative as well) the manufacturing 
sector regressions, a finding that is very much consistent with the impact of currency 
appreciation on manufacturing sectors. The results on capitalization is consistent with the 
view that both manufacturing and services sector loan shares are increasing in banking 
system capitalization. However, the bank deposits coefficients suggest that banks offer more 
to manufacturing than services sector when deposits increase. We check the robustness of 
these baseline results in Table 3 using a range of sensitivity tests which is now discussed in 
turns.  
5.3.Robustness tests: quantile regression estimates 
There might be concerns that our empirical results are seriously affected by undue outliers in 
the empirical distribution of our data. Hence, we use a quantile regression approach which is 
based on least absolute deviations rather than least squared residuals. This allows us to check 
the effects of oil booms at different points in the conditional distribution of sectoral credit 
shares. Specifically, a quantile regression is based on the parameter: q, the researcher’s 
chosen probability level for isolating the proportion of the sample lying on or below the 
quantile regression line. 
Table 4 presents the coefficient estimates of the quantile regressions across 0.1-0.9 
quantiles. Notice that as the sectoral loan shares vary across quantiles, the estimated effect of 
the boom variable for the manufacturing sector is consistently negative and largely 
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significant. In particular, as the manufacturing loan shares change across quantiles the 
estimate of the oil boom effect varies reasonably in terms of magnitude and degree of 
statistical significance. This is supported by the F-test statistic on the equality of the QR slope 
estimates which rejects the null that the slope estimates are equal at the 1% level. Therefore, 
the QR estimates are qualitatively analogous to the main results in Table 3.  
We now turn to the QR estimates for the services sector credit shares which are 
presented in Table 5. In line with the main results, the QR estimates of the boom effect on the 
service sector loans are positive across the board, although some of the estimates lose 
statistical significance. Both sets of QR estimates therefore indicate that the relationship 
between oil price booms and sectoral loan shares across non-central regions or points of our 
data sample are consistent and similar to those obtained when using an approach based on the 
central tendency of probability distributions. Hence, we conclude that our results are robust to 
outlier problems. 
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Table 4: Robustness test: Quantile regression for manufacturing sector credit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dependent variable is the ratio of manufacturing sector loan to total loans. The results are based on quantile regression approach reported in columns 2-10. Consistent standard errors which 
are reported in the brackets are obtained using bootstrapping. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 Quantile 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Boom -0.0002 -0.0017*** -0.0021** -0.0019* -0.0015 -0.0019* -0.0019* -0.0028*** -0.0018 
 
[0.0004] [0.006] [0.009] [0.008] [0.0010] [0.0011] [0.0010] [0.009] [0.0012] 
Deposit -0.0014*** -0.0028*** -0.0045*** -0.0054*** -0.0039*** -0.0040*** -0.0026*** -0.0013 -0.0032** 
 
[0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0012] [0.0013] 
Capital 0.0133*** 0.0163*** 0.0180*** 0.0197*** 0.0241*** 0.0284*** 0.0300*** 0.0310*** 0.0220*** 
 
[0.0008] [0.0012] [0.0009] [0.0014] [0.0019] [0.0016] [0.0026] [0.0054] [0.0081] 
Interest rate 0.1215*** 0.1209*** 0.1495*** 0.1610*** 0.1488*** 0.1154*** 0.0387** 0.0301 0.0020 
 
[0.0118] [0.0146] [0.0251] [0.0185] [0.0195] [0.0219] [0.0172] [0.0238] [0.0175] 
Exchange rate -0.0017 0.0022 -0.0076* -0.0112 -0.0413*** -0.0507*** -0.0862*** -0.1083*** -0.0905*** 
 [0.0037] [0.0045] [0.0040] [0.0077] [0.0042] [0.0055] [0.0081] [0.0110] [0.0084] 
Liquidity -0.0087*** -0.0126*** -0.0146*** -0.0168*** -0.0221*** -0.0248*** -0.0154*** -0.0082** 0.0001 
 [0.0019] [0.0025] [0.0016] [0.0022] [0.0027] [0.0016] [0.0026] [0.0031] [0.0037] 
Size -0.0019* -0.0035*** -0.0042*** -0.0050*** -0.0091*** -0.0120*** -0.0097*** -0.0076 0.0056 
 [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0006] [0.0010] [0.0014] [0.0017] [0.0025] [0.0066] [0.0090] 
OPEC -0.0475*** -0.0466*** -0.0400*** -0.0376*** -0.0435*** -0.0471*** -0.0492*** -0.0439*** -0.0473*** 
 [0.0028] [0.0025] [0.0027] [0.0037] [0.0032] [0.0033] [0.0041] [0.0036] [0.0041] 
Institutions  0.0001 -0.0010* 0.0015 0.0025* 0.0027** 0.0012 0.0012 -0.0042 -0.0057 
 [0.0004] [0.0006] [0.0011] [0.0014] [0.0011] [0.0012] [0.0020] [0.0034] [0.0036] 
Constant 0.0247 0.0251 0.0734*** 0.0914*** 0.2332*** 0.2858*** 0.3882*** 0.4332*** 0.3099*** 
 [0.0170] [0.0225] [0.0176] [0.0329] [0.0229] [0.0245] [0.0295] [0.0612] [0.0501] 
N 2206 2206 2206 2206 2206 2206 2206 2206 2206 
          
Equality of slope estimates       Test  F-statistic p-value 
0.1 vs [0.2…0.9]             0.1= [0.2…0.9] 3.32 0.0016 
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Table 5: Robustness test: Quantile regression for services sector credit 
The dependent variable is the ratio of services sector loan to total loans. The results are based on quantile regression approach reported in columns 2-10. Consistent standard errors which are 
reported in the brackets are obtained using bootstrapping. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
 Quantile 
  0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Boom 0.0008** 0.0005 0.0013 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0002 0.0011*** 0.0001 
 
[0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0010] [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0007] [0.0003] [0.0002] 
Deposit 0.0030*** 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0012* 0.0019*** 0.0021*** 0.0024*** 0.0025*** 0.0021*** 
 
[0.0010] [0.0013] [0.0008] [0.0007] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0002] 
Capital -0.0187*** -0.0196*** -0.0185*** -0.0144*** -0.0131*** -0.0114*** -0.0099*** -0.0074*** -0.0051*** 
 
[0.0016] [0.0026] [0.0022] [0.0019] [0.0010] [0.0008] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0006] 
Interest rate -0.4228*** -0.1468** -0.0978*** -0.1098*** -0.1581*** -0.1788*** -0.2062*** -0.1928*** -0.1577*** 
 
[0.0694] [0.0650] [0.0230] [0.0275] [0.0165] [0.0133] [0.0110] [0.0114] [0.0127] 
Exchange rate 0.0639*** 0.0659*** 0.0566*** 0.0392*** 0.0209*** 0.0150*** 0.0098*** 0.0058** 0.0068*** 
 [0.0069] [0.0045] [0.0043] [0.0061] [0.0031] [0.0033] [0.0034] [0.0024] [0.0018] 
Liquidity 0.0131*** 0.0108*** 0.0086*** 0.0114*** 0.0138*** 0.0141*** 0.0141*** 0.0140*** 0.0125*** 
 [0.0040] [0.0029] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0014] [0.0007] [0.0013] [0.0009] [0.0004] 
Size -0.0002 0.0043 0.0071** 0.0040** 0.0044*** 0.0036*** 0.0025*** 0.0005 -0.0012* 
 [0.0021] [0.0031] [0.0025] [0.0017] [0.0009] [0.006] [0.0008] [0.0010] [0.0007] 
OPEC 0.0213*** 0.0202*** 0.0203*** 0.0242*** 0.0214*** 0.0200*** 0.0223*** 0.0237*** 0.0234*** 
 [0.0043] [0.0034] [0.0033] [0.0029] [0.0026] [0.0011] [0.0022] [0.0016] [0.0009] 
Institutions  -0.0043 0.0097** 0.0141*** 0.0073*** 0.0080*** 0.0079*** 0.0060*** 0.0028*** 0.0018*** 
 [0.0037] [0.0047] [0.0023] [0.0017] [0.0013] [0.0007] [0.0013] [0.0006] [0.0003] 
Constant 0.2919*** 0.2413*** 0.2543*** 0.3112*** 0.3751*** 0.4145*** 0.4484*** 0.4673*** 0.4577*** 
 [0.0420] [0.0306] [0.0236] [0.0245] [0.0155] [0.0148] [0.0179] [0.0135] [0.0093] 
          
N 2206 2206 2206 2206 2206 2206 2206 2206 2206 
Equality of slope estimates       Test  F-statistic p-value 
0.1 vs [0.2…0.9]             0.1= [0.2…0.9] 2.23 0.0296 
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5.4.Robustness tests: alternative measures of oil booms 
Although we derive our boom variable from the underlying deviation of actual oil prices from 
forecast series, it is possible that this measure might incorrectly infer the magnitude of oil 
price booms, especially in instances where market expectations (upon which price forecasts 
are based) are inaccurate or misplaced. Therefore, we use an alternative oil boom variable 
which we constructed using the Hamilton’s (1996) net oil price measure (NOP)29. Consider 
the log level of monthly oil prices as 𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 so that the monthly changes in oil prices is given by 
∆𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 = (𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 − 𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘−1); these changes can be decomposed into increases only (𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘+) and 
decreases only (𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘−), so that our boom measure pertains to the increases only measure 
𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘
+ = max (0,∆𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘)             [11]
    
To construct the NOP variable that measures oil price increases, Hamilton then suggested to 
compare oil prices with where they had been over the previous year, rather than where it was 
the previous month, so that the NOP pertains to the maximum value of oil price during the 
preceding year, i.e. it is the increase from the previous year’s monthly high price if it is 
positive, but zero otherwise: 
         𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 = max [0, 𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 − max(𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘−1, 𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘−2, … , 𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘−12)]           [12] 
Using this measure, we then derive country-specific equivalents using the weights in eqn. [8]. 
Finally, our second country-adjusted boom measure can be specified as  
    𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘2 = 𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 × 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘            [13] 
A third, yet intuitive measure of oil boom is that based on break even prices (BEP). The 
external breakeven oil price is the oil price at which an oil-rich country’s current account 
balance is zero. The alternative fiscal breakeven price (the oil price that is needed for an oil 
exporting country to balance its budget in time t), suffers from serious limitations, despite its 
                                                          
29 Similar applications can be found in Borenstein et al. (1997); Gately and Huntington (2002); Griffin and Schulman 
(2005). See also Bjørnland (2009) and Wang, et al. (2013) for applications in financial market research.  
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appeal that many oil producers rely heavily on oil revenue to finance their fiscal spending. 
Setser and Frank (2017) highlight these limitations as including the reality that (i) budget 
revenues from oil are hardly reported transparently (ii) key government spending is 
sometimes kept off-budget and (iii) fiscal accounting or calculations vary across countries, 
making accurate comparisons impossible.  
However, the external breakeven price is a more complete measure that can be 
consistently estimated and easily verified30. Intuitively, it also embodies the reality that an oil 
exporter’s currency is likely to adjust to compensate for changes in fiscal or budget positions- 
weaker currencies stimulate the local currency oil export revenue values towards stabilizing 
government revenue. Hence, we derive a third oil boom measure from the magnitude by 
which actual oil prices exceed the external break-even oil prices. This boom variable is 
consistent with the reality that such market situations carry the potential for additional fiscal 
spending, as might be obtained with the alternative fiscal breakeven prices. The external 
breakeven price is calculated by subtracting a country’s current account balance 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ($) 
from the value of its net oil exports revenue 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜 ($) and dividing this measure by the 
volume of net oil exports (barrels): 
          𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑄𝑄𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑘𝑜𝑜          [14] 
As with the previous measures, we derive country-specific measures on the third boom using 
country weights,  
 
      𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘3 = [0, (𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘 − 𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘) ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘]       [15] 
 
                                                          
30 See Setser and Frank (2017) for a very detailed discussion.  
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Table 6: Robustness test: Alternative boom measures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table reports robustness tests of oil price boom and credit using an alternative boom measure based on Hamilton (1996). 
The dependent and other independent variables are analogous: manufacturing and service sector shares of total credit–
defined as the ratio of manufacturing or services sector loans to total loans. Columns 2 and 4 report the OLS coefficients for 
both sectors. Columns 3 and 5 report IV estimates. Kleibergen-Paap weak and underidentification LM and Wald tests are 
conducted under the null hypotheses that model is weakly identified and underidentified. For the weak id test, 10% maximal 
IV critical value in parentheses. For the under-id test, Chi p-values are reported in parentheses. Hansen test statistic of the 
over-identifying restrictions is asymptotically chi-square distributed under the null of instrument validity; p-values are 
reported in parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported in parenthesis are clustered for countries. ***, **, 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
 
  
  Manufacturing loan share   Services loan share 
  Hamilton Break-even   Hamilton Break-even 
Boom -0.1314*** -0.0514*** 
 
0.0935*** 0.0363*** 
 
[0.0370]  [0.0122] 
 
[0.0255]    [0.0084] 
Deposit 0.00370 0.0075** 
 
0.0028 0.0004 
 
[0.00390] [0.0034] 
 
[0.0035] [0.0033] 
Capital 0.0020** -0.0012 
 
0.0051*** 0.0073*** 
 
[0.0008] [0.0015] 
 
[0.0009] [0.0014] 
Interest rate 0.1523*** 0.1728*** 
 
-0.0943*** -0.1081*** 
 
[0.0163] [0.0195] 
 
[0.0192] [0.0209] 
Exchange rate -0.0161*** -0.0185*** 
 
0.0043 0.0062 
 [0.0062] [0.0062] 
 
[0.005] [0.0050] 
Liquidity -0.0123*** -0.0166*** 
 
0.0061*** 0.0092*** 
 [0.0013] [0.0016] 
 
[0.001] [0.0012] 
Size -0.0110*** -0.0106*** 
 
0.0039*** 0.0035*** 
 [0.0014] [0.0012] 
 
[0.0012] [0.0011] 
OPEC 0.0902*** 0.0937*** 
 
-0.0471*** -0.0495*** 
 [0.0057] [0.0053] 
 
[0.0033] [0.0030] 
Institutions  0.0042*** 0.0041*** 
 
-0.0068*** -0.0067*** 
 [0.0008] [0.0008] 
 
[0.0007] [0.0007] 
   
 
  
(Centered) R-squared 0.56 0.58 
 
0.42 0.45 
Month dummies Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 65.91 111.77 
 
65.91 111.77 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
 
[0.000] [0.000] 
Weak id test: KP LM statistic 33.25 88.94 
 
33.25 88.94 
 [19.93] [19.93] 
 
[19.93] [19.93] 
Over id test: Hansen J statistic 0.28 0.15 
 
0.41 0.22 
 [0.60] [0.70] 
 
[0.52] [0.64] 
Instrument  Weather Weather 
 
Weather Weather 
N 2180 2180   2180 2180 
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The regression results pertaining to the two alternative boom measures are presented in Table 
6. The model estimations indicate that credit contraction (expansion) to the manufacturing 
(services) sector are associated with booming oil prices. The sign on the coefficients are 
consistent across estimated models, corroborating our earlier findings. Therefore, we 
conclude that our findings are robust to alternative boom measures. 
5.5.Robustness tests: additional checks 
There might be some valid criticisms of our analyses so far: (i) using the manufacturing 
sector as the tradeable sector of oil producers might be inappropriate since the manufacturing 
sectors across these economies are weak, and therefore face greater credit constraints31 (ii) as 
a result of (i) above, manufacturing firms hardly rely on external finance. To address these 
issues, we undertake two additional analyses as follows.  
5.5.1. Alternative tradeable sector 
First, we designate the agricultural sector as an alternative tradeable sector and use the loan 
shares of this sector as our alternative dependent variable in the tradeable sector regression. 
The regression results for this alternative tradable sector are presented in Table 7. Contrary to 
the previous sectoral loan share regressions, we use variable costs of oil production and 
number of oil rigs as instruments to identify the effects of oil booms on agricultural loan 
share. Intuitively, agricultural performance (and by extension its credit prospects) can be 
buffeted by weather-related shocks, such that the weather instrument is likely to be correlated 
with the unmeasured agricultural sector outlook embedded in the random error term of the 
model.32 Hence, we use variable cost of oil production and rig counts to instrument for the 
boom variable. Our underlying finding that credit allocated to the tradeable sector contracts 
                                                          
31 See Beck, et al. (2005) and Yuxiang and Chen (2011) 
32 In this case the orthogonality conditions will be violated.  
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during oil booms remains intact. Hence our findings are robust to alternative tradeable sector 
specifications/definitions.    
Table 7: Robustness test: IV Alternative tradeable sector. 
  
  FE-IV 
Boom -0.0072*** 
 
[0.0020] 
Deposit 0.0064*** 
 
[0.0018] 
Capital -0.0019** 
 
[0.0008] 
Interest rate 0.0650*** 
 
[0.0156] 
Exchange rate -0.0021 
 [0.0023] 
Liquidity 0.0003 
 [0.0007] 
Size -0.0024*** 
 [0.0007] 
OPEC 0.0086*** 
 [0.0010] 
Institutions  -0.0003 
 [0.0003] 
  
R-squared 0.40 
Month dummies Yes 
Year dummies Yes 
Country dummies Yes 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 26.91 
 [0.000] 
Weak id test: KP LM statistic 12.49 
 [19.93] 
Over id test: Hansen J statistic 1.84 
 [0.17] 
Instrument  Oil rig & cost 
N 2193 
This table reports IV robustness tests of oil price boom and credit using an alternative tradeable sector- agricultural sector. 
The independent variables are analogous while the dependent variable is agricultural sector share of total credit: defined as 
the ratio of manufacturing or services sector loans to total loans. We use variable cost of oil production and lagged global oil 
rig counts. Kleibergen-Paap weak and underidentification LM and Wald tests are conducted under the null hypotheses that 
model is weakly identified and underidentified. For the weak id test, 10% maximal IV critical value in parentheses. For the 
under-id test, Chi p-values are reported in parentheses. Hansen test statistic of the over-identifying restrictions is 
asymptotically chi-square distributed under the null of instrument validity; p-values are reported in parentheses. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported in parenthesis are clustered for countries. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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5.5.2. Firm-level analysis of external finance dependence 
Secondly, we explore the potential criticism about the credit reliance of manufacturing 
sectors across sampled countries. If firms across these economies are less dependent on 
external finance/bank loans, then the implications of the loan pattern results in this study 
might be somewhat tempered. We therefore investigate the role of loan dependence across a 
panel of manufacturing firms in 8 of the 13 sampled countries. First, we collect firm-level 
data33on manufacturing enterprises from the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES)34. 
Following Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), we measure firm 
external finance dependence as, 
             𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘           [16] 
where 𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is the total value of bank loan secured by firm i during period t while 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is 
the firm’s cost of production. We present a range of statistical measures and indicators on this 
variable in Table 8. For the whole sample, the average loan dependence amounts to 7% of 
total cost across sampled firms, ranging from 3% in Azerbaijan to 13% in Kazakhstan. Notice 
that the standard deviations are larger than the means of loan dependence across the board, 
indicating that the distribution of the loan dependence variable is right-skewed: most of the 
data points are located on the high. This remains unchanged when we evaluate these statistics 
for sub-samples based on firm size and export participation.  
The last column of Table 3 contains information on the share of firms with disbursed 
bank loans during the study period. Across the whole sample of 1415 manufacturing firms, 
806 firms (57% of sample) had bank loans during the period under consideration; indicating 
that more than half of our sample relied on external finance.  
                                                          
33 See Appendix A for a full list of variables and definitions. 
34 The WBES is a stratified random sample survey of a representative sample of manufacturing and service firms across the 
private sectors of covered countries. The resulting sample covered in Table 8 is based on data availability in the WBES as 
countries not covered by the WBES are unavoidably omitted from our micro analysis. 
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Table 8: Distribution of bank loan dependence. 
This table reports descriptive statistics for bank loan dependence across manufacturing firms in 8 countries. Loan 
dependence is the ratio of total bank loan to firm production cost. Columns 5 reports the percentage of firms across sampled 
countries that obtained a bank loan over the sample period.     
 
The proportion of firms relying on bank loans appears fairly significant across 
sampled countries, with the exception Azerbaijan, where the proportion of loan-dependent 
firms is only 14%. In general, we also observed subsample loan dependence in terms of firm 
size and export participation. Across these sub-sample categories, firm loan dependence is 
established for 50% or more of the sampled firms. These findings indicate that a non-trivial 
proportion of manufacturing plants across our sampled oil-rich countries have bank loans. 
Hence, we can expect the pattern of bank loans across these economies to have impact on 
firm growth and performance. We turn now to evaluating the impact of loan dependence on 
firm performance.  
Returns to loan dependence in the manufacturing sector 
Using the WBES data above, we gauge the relationship between loan dependence and a 
vector of firm performance response variables, 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘:  
    
 Sample Mean Std. Dev. # of firms % with loans 
Whole sample 0.071 0.198 1415 57% 
Azerbaijan 0.025 0.107 88 14% 
Brazil 0.101 0.183 452 78% 
Cote d' Ivoire    0.133 0.287 36 86% 
Nigeria 0.043 0.180 60 27% 
Indonesia 0.041 0.176 406 51% 
Kazakhstan   0.082 0.312 81 25% 
Mexico 0.067 0.193 189 58% 
Russia 0.086 0.250 103 52% 
     By firm size 
    Large 0.090 0.225 437 71% 
Small 0.064 0.187 978 50% 
     Exporter 
    Yes 0.058 0.154 435 65% 
No 0.074 0.207 980 53% 
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                 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = (𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑛𝑛𝐵𝐵𝑝𝑝𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘,𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘)                                [17] 
where 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is total market sales of firm i in period t, and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is the monetary value of 
firm exports. These variables are given in nominal local currency units, which we (i) deflated 
using annual CPI values from the WDI database and (ii) converted to purchasing power 
parities using PPP conversion factors. All values are then normalized to 2005 base year. We 
evaluate the changes in the elements of 𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 as a function of the independent variable, loan 
dependence 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘: 
               𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 = 𝛼𝛼1𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 + 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘′ 𝛽𝛽 + 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘 + ξ𝑘𝑘 + ε𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘          [18]
          
where 𝛼𝛼1, … ,𝛼𝛼2 is a 2 × 1 vector of regression parameters that capture the relationships 
between  𝑌𝑌𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 and 𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘. 𝑋𝑋𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘′  contains firm characteristics such as labour, capital, firm age and 
firm size.  𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘 is a 2 × 1 vector of fixed firm effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity 
in performance between firms, ξ𝑘𝑘 is a vector of time fixed effects to control for certain 
unobserved time trends that affect firm performance, over and above the effect the loan 
dependence variable. ε𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 is a vector of idiosyncratic error terms.  
We present regression results for eqn. [18] in Table 9. In general, we find that loan 
dependence is positively associated with firm turnover and exports, albeit the coefficients on 
firm exports are not significant at conventional levels. In summary, the results in Table 8 and 
9 indicate that a significant percentage of manufacturing firms across sampled oil-dependent 
countries rely on bank loans for their operations, with positive contributions to their operating 
performance. Therefore, one could argue that the credit allocation pattern observed in this 
study will have serious implications for the manufacturing sector, as suggested by the Dutch 
disease hypothesis.  
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Table 9: The effect of loan dependence on firm performance. 
 
 
     
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table reports the effects of loan dependence on firm performance (total sales and export values), controlling for firm 
production function and characteristics. Columns 1-4 present FE estimates with and without country_firm dummies. We do 
not estimate IV regressions as endogeneity test statistic of 0.017 (Chi-sq. p-val = 0.896) indicates no endogeneity problems. 
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis are clustered at country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
5.6.Further estimation issues 
Although we employ an IV approach where we address concerns about the endogeneity of 
the oil price boom measure, nonetheless, we consider two other critical issues. First, we 
consider the plausible case in which other RHS variables might be endogenous. Following 
from a battery of Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity tests35 on our RHS variables, we treat 
interest and exchange rates as endogenous within our model estimations. The re-estimated 
regression results are presented in Table 10. Again, the qualitative implications of our main 
findings remain intact- oil booms are associated with contraction (expansion) in 
manufacturing (services) share of bank loans. 
 
                                                          
35 The test results are available from the authors upon request. 
  Sales   Export 
  1 2   3 4 
Capital 0.1024*** 0.0915*** 
 
0.0134 0.0193 
 
[0.0253] [0.0232] 
 
[0.0407] [0.0284] 
Labour 0.5057*** -0.098 
 
1.0603*** 0.5376* 
 
[0.123] [0.3175] 
 
[0.2788] [0.3194] 
Age 0.5890** 0.7552* 
 
0.5323** 1.0272* 
 
[0.2004] [0.3888] 
 
[0.2652] [0.4791] 
Size 0.5996** 1.1769 
 
0.5792* -0.7059 
 
[0.3031] [1.153] 
 
[0.3414] [1.0499] 
Loan dependence 0.133** 0.0676* 
 
0.0678 0.0120 
 [0.0569] [0.0390] 
 
[0.0613] [0.0491] 
   
 
  
R-squared 0.32 0.15 
 
0.08 0.03 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes No 
 
Yes No 
Country_firm dummies No Yes 
 
No Yes 
N 2685 2685   2697 2697 
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Table 10: IV regressions treating oil boom, interest and exchange rates as endogenous 
  Manufacturing Agriculture Services 
Boom -0.0103*** -0.0111*** 0.0072*** 
 
[0.0032] [0.0043] [0.0021] 
Deposit 0.0094** 0.0056** -0.0009 
 
[0.0038] [0.0022] [0.0033] 
Capital 0.0036*** -0.0010 0.0039*** 
 
[0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] 
Interest rate 0.1502*** 0.0694*** -0.0931*** 
 
[0.0217] [0.0206] [0.0209] 
Exchange rate -0.0112** 0.0023 0.0005 
 
[0.0055] [0.0028] [0.0045] 
Liquidity -0.0103*** 0.0012 0.0048*** 
 
[0.0013] [0.0010] [0.001] 
Size -0.0097*** -0.0019** 0.0028** 
 
[0.0012] [0.0008] [0.0011] 
OPEC 0.0929*** 0.0083*** -0.0490*** 
 
[0.0055] [0.0011] [0.0032] 
Institutions  0.0039*** -0.0003 -0.0065*** 
 
[0.0008] [0.0003] [0.0007] 
    R-squared 0.54 0.84 0.42 
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 33.82 8.70 33.82 
 
[0.000] [0.013] [0.000] 
Cragg-Donald Statistic 18.128 11.747 18.128 
 
   
Over id test: Hansen J statistic 0.043 2.29 0.06 
 
[0.86] [0.13] [0.81] 
Instrument  Weather Weather Oil rig & cost 
N 2180 2193 2180 
This table reports robustness tests of oil price boom and credit using an alternative instrumental variables model 
specification with the RHS variables lagged one quarter (i.e. 3 months). The dependent variables are analogous to those in 
Table 3 and7. Kleibergen–Paap weak and underidentification LM and Wald tests are conducted under the null hypotheses 
that model is weakly identified and underidentified. For the weak id test, 10% maximal IV critical value in parentheses. For 
the under-id test, Chi p-values are reported in parentheses. Hansen test statistic of the over-identifying restrictions is 
asymptotically chi-square distributed under the null of instrument validity; p-values are reported in parentheses. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported in parenthesis are clustered for countries. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Secondly, we consider an alternative model specification where all RHS variables are 
lagged on a quarterly basis (i.e. 3 months) to further mitigate concerns of reverse causality. 
This approach is particularly appealing, since credit allocation decisions might rely on 
previous information on specified regressors. These re-estimated IV regressions are given in 
37 
 
Table 11. Notice that, as in previous regressions, credit share contraction (expansion) in the 
manufacturing/agricultural (services) is associated with oil price booms; underpinning our 
previous findings.  
Table 11: Alternative model specification with independent variables are lagged one quarter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table reports robustness tests of oil price boom and credit using an alternative instrumental variables model 
specification with the RHS variables lagged one quarter (i.e. 3 months). The dependent variables are analogous to those in 
Table 3 and 7. Kleibergen-Paap (2006) weak and underidentification LM and Wald tests are conducted under the null 
hypotheses that model is weakly identified and underidentified. For the weak id test, 10% maximal IV critical value in 
parentheses. For the under-id test, Chi p-values are reported in parentheses. Hansen test statistic of the over-identifying 
restrictions is asymptotically chi-square distributed under the null of instrument validity; p-values are reported in 
parentheses. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported in parenthesis are clustered for countries. ***, **, and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
  Manufacturing Agriculture Services 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘−3  -0.0086*** -0.0085** 0.0060*** 
 
[0.0026] [0.0042] [0.0017] 
𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘−3  0.0075** 0.0056*** 0.0009 
 
[0.0037] [0.0019] [0.0035] 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘−3  0.0016* -0.0018** 0.0036*** 
 
[0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0010] 
𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑟𝑟𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘−3  0.1164*** 0.0630*** -0.0840*** 
 
[0.0164] [0.0149] [0.0197] 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴ℎ𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑘𝑘−3  -0.0126** -0.0018 0.0008 
 
[0.0051] [0.0024] [0.0041] 
𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐿𝐿𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑘𝑘−3  -0.0118*** 0.0004 0.0052*** 
 
[0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0010] 
𝑆𝑆𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑘𝑘−3  -0.0089*** -0.0022*** 0.0025** 
 
[0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0011] 
𝑂𝑂𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘−3  0.0924*** 0.0086*** -0.0490*** 
 
[0.0053] [0.0010] [0.0031] 
𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑝𝑝𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛𝐹𝐹𝑘𝑘−3  0.0049*** -0.0003 -0.0068*** 
  [0.0010] [0.0003] [0.0007] 
    R-squared 0.56 0.37 0.44 
Month dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Under id test: KP LM statistic 37.28 7.78 37.28 
 
[0.000] [0.0204] [0.000] 
Weak id test: KP LM statistic 20.68 3.468 20.68 
 
[19.93] [19.93] [19.93] 
Over id test: Hansen J statistic 0.002 3.96 0.043 
 
[0.97] [0.05] [0.83] 
Instrument  Weather Oil rig & cost Weather 
N 2154 2154 2154 
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6.  Concluding remarks and policy implications  
Banks play key functions in every economy by screening investment projects and allocating 
capital accordingly. As Stiglitz (1993) argued, if they fail in these functions, the costs and 
implications to the economy are huge. It is therefore imperative to investigate the extent to 
which banking systems in resource rich countries efficiently allocate or intermediate 
resources during commodity booms. This question has become critical to our understanding 
of the linkages between the level of financial development and resource dependence. It is no 
less important for our understanding of the extent to which banks (fail to) intermediate these 
booms, as little is known about bank credit allocation behaviour during commodity price 
booms. Using banking sector-level data for a sample of 13 oil producing countries, we 
provide the first comprehensive analysis of the effects of commodity booms on sectoral credit 
allocation.  
Our results show that the pattern of sectoral credit allocation during commodity 
booms are symptomatic of the Dutch disease- manufacturing (services) sector share of bank 
lending shrinks (expands) during periods of oil booms. Given these findings, we robustly 
reject the null hypotheses that banks play a role in countervailing the Dutch disease through 
their credit screening and efficient intermediation function. Consequently, we argue that 
credit allocation patterns during oil booms potentially constitute a channel through which the 
Dutch disease syndrome stagnates tradeable sector investments and productivity 
performance.36 This pattern is also consistent with the view of a financial resource curse 
(Beck, 2011). These findings are robust to a battery of robustness checks such as an 
instrumental variables approach which caters to heterogeneity and endogeneity concerns; 
alternative measures of oil boom, quantile regressions aimed at isolating our relationship of 
                                                          
36 See Benigno and Fornato (2014) for some theoretical exposition on this idea.  
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interest at different points in the conditional distribution of credit allocation, an alternative 
definition of the tradeable sector, as well as an alternative model specification.   
Our results have important policy implications. First it should be clear that the strong 
rejection of our null hypothesis indicates that central banks across sampled countries have to 
take on the role of seeing beyond the boom as they cannot rely on the banks’ efficient capital 
allocation business to carry out countervailing policies. This appears consistent with the 
arguments by Benigno and Fornato (2014) for some form of interventions in the flow of 
productive resources across the economy in order to mitigate the misallocation of resources 
during an episode of financial resource curse.37 This idea seems justified since our results 
indicate that the “public good” element of the banking system credit allocation might be 
inadequate to countervail the resource curse. 
While our study constitutes the first comprehensive analysis of sectoral credit 
allocation across banking systems of oil rich countries, we recognize that the findings of this 
study may not apply to other commodity classes. Hence, it is hoped that future studies will 
aim to understand the behaviour of credit patterns during booms of other commodity types. 
Furthermore, it would also be interesting to place our results in the context of future research 
relying on alternative methods. In the long run, this would contribute to the evolution of a 
rich array of identification strategies for evaluating credit patterns arising from commodity 
booms. Also, future analogous analyses using bank-level data are required to investigate 
micro-level bank lending behaviour during commodity booms. Such microeconomic analyses 
will also allow for the disentangling of bank-level behaviour from other macro effects. 
However, we note the difficulty arising from the lack of suitable microdata on bank-level 
                                                          
37 As Gylfason (2006) argues, resource based economies can efficiently use resources/revenues from windfalls as buffer to 
smooth consumption over the boom-burst cycles that are prevalent in oil price movements.  
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sectoral lending spanning a reasonably long period38 to conduct a meaningful analysis of 
commodity price shocks. 
Finally, theoretical and empirical arguments indicate different channels through which 
the Dutch disease syndrome impacts the economy. These channels include (i) trade/exchange 
rate channel (ii) spending effects and (iii) weak institutions. It is possible to test these 
channels along with the use of bank-level data. For instance, it would be interesting to 
unravel the channels through which commodity booms shape bank credit policies in the 
context of (i) foreign asset exposure (ii) market power and (iii) management quality. These 
bank-level channels are rough analogues of the macro-level channels above.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38 For instance, Bureau Van Dijk’s major bank database Orbis Bank Focus which succeeds the legacy Bankscope database 
has only contains 6 years’ history for listed banks and 4 years for unlisted.  
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Variables definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Banking sector-level data   
Agriculture share of credit  Ratio of banking sector loan to agricultural sector to total loans Monthly central bank statistical bulletins, several 
Manufacturing sector share of credit Ratio of total banking sector loan to manufacturing sector to total loans Monthly central bank statistical bulletins, several 
Service sector share of credit  Ratio of total banking sector loan to services sector to total loans Monthly central bank statistical bulletins, several 
Oil price boom  Spot oil price deviations from forecast prices EIA 
Real interest rate Average monthly lending rate Monthly central bank statistical bulletins, several 
Total deposits  Total value of banking sector deposits, including private and public-sector deposits Monthly central bank statistical bulletins, several 
Total capital  Total value of equity capital in the banking sector Monthly central bank statistical bulletins, several 
Real exchange rate Real effective exchange rate (REER) IMF-IFS 
Liquidity Ratio of broad money (M2) to international reserves Monthly central bank statistical bulletins, several 
Banking sector size Total banking sector assets Monthly central bank statistical bulletins, several 
OPEC  Dummy variable equal to 1 if the country is a member of OPEC, zero otherwise Authors’ calculation  
Institutional quality index Constructed by applying principal component analysis to World Governance indicators  Kaufmann et al. (2010) 
 
  
Instrumental variables   
Variable cost per barrel of oil in the US  US oil sector: (Total man hours * hourly wage * total oil produced)/(volume of oil produced) U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and EIA  
Global temperature  Monthly average global temperature  U.K. Met Office 
Total world oil rigs Count of operational oil rigs across the world  Baker Hughes, Inc. database 
 
  
Firm-level data  
 
Sales Total value of firm sales  WBES 
Export Total value of firm sales for export WBES 
Capital  Net book value of buildings and equipment WBES 
Labour  Total number of employees WBES 
Age Firm age derived as operating year minus date of birth WBES 
Size WBES Firm size classification WBES 
Loan dependence  Ratio of firm total loan value to operating cost WBES 
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Supplementary variables   
Consumer price index (CPI) Monthly consumer price indices IMF-IFS 
PPP conversion factors  PPP conversion factor, GDP (LCU per international $) WDI 
Country weights for boom Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports)  WDI 
Country weights for instruments Country oil reserves (% of global oil reserves) BP Annual Statistical Bulletin 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1: Panel unit root tests 
 
IPS 
 
CIPS 
  Statistic p value   Statistic p value 
Boom -11.76* 0.000 
 
-11.584* 0.000 
Manufacturing -5.17* 0.000 
 
-5.338* 0.000 
Services -4.975* 0.000 
 
-6.570* 0.000 
Exchange rate 0.064 0.526 
 
-1.436 0.076 
Interest rate -5.611* 0.000 
 
-9.527* 0.000 
Deposit -3.772* 0.000 
 
-3.916* 0.000 
Capital -4.225* 0.000 
 
-5.920* 0.000 
Liquidity -7.8554 * 0.000 
 
-9.8834* 0.000 
Size -0.158 0.437 
 
-3.980* 0.000 
Notes: IPS refers to the panel unit root test of Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) and CIPS refers to the panel unit root test of 
Pesaran (2007) which accounts for cross-sectional dependence among sampled countries. *Rejection of the null hypothesis 
at 5% significance level. The 5% critical value for the IPS statistics is -1.730 and the 5% critical value for the CIPS statistics 
is -2.120 
 
 
 
Table B2: Relationship between oil price boom and instruments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table presents the first stage regression of the oil price boom on employed instruments. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are presented in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 2 3 
Temperature 4.510***   
 
[0.684]   
Oil rigs  0.001***  
 
 [0.000]  
Variable cost   0.037*** 
 
  [0.005] 
Constant 0.988***  0.955*** 0.786*** 
 [0.182] [0.178] [0.173] 
R-sqr 0.43 0.44 0.45 
N 2206 2206 2206 
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Appendix C 
Construction of institutional quality variable 
Our institutional quality measure is constructed by applying principal component analysis 
(PCA) to the World Governance indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann et al., 2010). The indicators 
cover six dimensions: (i) Voice and accountability (ii) Political stability (iii) Government 
effectiveness (iv) Regulatory quality (v) Rule of law and (vi) Control of corruption. One the 
one hand using only one dimension of the WGI (e.g. iv: regulatory quality) might prove 
inadequate in capturing the quality of institutions across sampled counties. On the other hand, 
including all five dimensions in the same regression poses the challenge of multicollinearity. 
Consequently, the PCA is a sensible compromise that eliminates the potential 
multicollinearity between the WGI dimensional measures, while also boosting the precision 
and efficiency of model estimations by reducing the number of RHS variables.  
 We use PCA to combine the six above mentioned WGI components to create a 
parsimonious composite institutional quality variable (i.e., principal components) by filtering 
out redundancies in the original indicators, while retaining the underlying variation in the 
original series. The resulting composite variable employed in our regressions “Comp1” 
captures the common variation among the WGI indicators, as demonstrated by its eigenvalue 
of 4.27>1, as well accounting for 71% variation (see table C1).  
Table C1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 4.279 3.270 0.713 0.713 
Comp2 1.009 0.620 0.168 0.881 
Comp3 0.389 0.219 0.065 0.946 
Comp4 0.170 0.087 0.028 0.975 
Comp5 0.083 0.012 0.014 0.988 
Comp6 0.071 - 0.012 1 
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Although our analysis is based on monthly data, the institutional variable has an 
annual frequency, so we repeat the annual values for all 12 months in the corresponding year. 
This approach seems consistent with the fact that quality of economic and political 
institutions is likely to have an attribute of persistence: i.e. changes are gradual or relatively 
slow-changing (North, 1994; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010).  
Appendix D 
Figure D1: Key events and the evolution of real oil prices 
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